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REVIEW ESSAY
BUILDING AN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Derek S. Reveron
Negroponte, John. National Intelligence Strategy. Washington,
D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2005.
32pp.
Negroponte, John. Strategic Human Capital Plan: An Annex to
the US National Intelligence Strategy, Washington, D.C.: Office
of the Director of National Intelligence, 2006. 47pp.
(Both documents are available online at www.odni.gov.)
Spurred by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the poor analysis of Iraq’s weapons of mass
destruction programs, and numerous studies, the Intelligence Reform and Ter-
rorism Prevention Act of 2004 created the Office of Director of National Intelli-
gence (ODNI). Run by former ambassador John Negroponte, ODNI is an
independent agency meant to oversee U.S. government intelligence activities
and to transform the American intelligence commu-
nity. Guiding Director Negroponte’s efforts are two
very different lessons learned from 9/11. First, that
attack has been characterized as a failure to “connect
the dots.” If only intelligence agencies had shared
their data, analysts could have predicted al Qa’ida’s
plan to attack, though the dots were not specific
enough to connect the overall plan with individual
names. To share intelligence, to “connect the dots,” is
now a national priority. Consequently, the slogan is
“share, share, share.” The second lesson, derived
from prewar intelligence on Iraq, offers a contradic-
tory lesson—to “collect more dots.” While there was
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human intelligence informing of Iraq’s weapons programs, it proved to be
wrong. The slogan, however, is “collect, collect, collect.”
Given these lessons and guiding legislation, ODNI is tasked to integrate U.S.
intelligence, bring depth and accuracy to analysis, and ensure that resources
generate future capabilities. However, the task to unify sixteen different agencies
across six different departments will not be easy. With such a Herculean effort
before him, Negroponte is well positioned to offer insight into the first-ever Na-
tional Intelligence Strategy and its accompanying Strategic Human Capital Plan.
Both documents outline mission objectives that will provide better intelligence
and enterprise objectives to transform the intelligence community.
The Strategy includes topics that have been long-standing intelligence re-
quirements, such as warning, counterproliferation, and counterterrorism, prob-
lems that transcend the private sector and touch all levels of government:
federal, state, local, even tribal. This all-encompassing approach will likely have
a dramatic impact on an intelligence community that fiercely guards its sources
and methods. While it is relatively easy for the CIA and FBI to share informa-
tion, there are legal, cultural, and technological factors that prevent the CIA
from sharing intelligence with the Rhode Island State Police, for example. Fur-
ther, though much attention has been focused on sharing intelligence within the
U.S. government, the Strategy also recognizes the importance of sharing intelli-
gence across national boundaries. Since 9/11, the United States has cultivated in-
telligence relationships with traditional allies like the United Kingdom, new
allies like Russia, and nontraditional partners like Yemen. Intelligence sharing is
not only essential in the war on terrorism but also provides a nonpublic way for
governments to cooperate with the United States.
Perhaps as a reflection of his diplomatic career, Negroponte notes that the in-
telligence community must identify opportunities for democratic transforma-
tion, and he warns of state failure. Although the promotion of democracy has
been a national priority for several decades, it is seldom linked to the intelligence
community. While the community’s role may be misinterpreted as limited to di-
rect action against dictators or supporting regime change, it is more likely that
the intelligence community will, for example, build on its decade-old partner-
ship with the Political Instability Task Force at the University of Maryland. This
task force attempts to understand why states fail, which should result in aid
packages targeted to ward off state failure. As President Bush acknowledged in
his 2002 National Security Strategy: “America is now threatened less by con-
quering states than we are by failing ones.” The challenge for Negroponte is to
find a balance between potential peer competitors (an institutional preference)
and states where American intervention will likely occur.
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The Strategy makes it clear that the United States has interests throughout the
globe. Negroponte states that “the Intelligence Community should develop, sus-
tain, and have access to expertise on every region, every transnational security is-
sue, and every threat to the American people.” With such a large goal, the strategy
emphasizes drawing from experts outside the government and upon
open-source data.
The Strategic Human Capital Plan outlines an approach to build an agile,
all-source force, win the war for talent, and create a culture of leadership at every
level. The Plan is also expected to determine the “optimum mix of military, civil-
ian, contractor, and other human resources” necessary to support the objectives
detailed in the strategy.
The Plan is marked throughout by sober assessment of the challenge for real
human capital. The intelligence community is handicapped by a lengthy hiring
process, stringent clearance requirements that generally exclude potentially
valuable bilingual noncitizens, and a personnel system that is not designed for a
new generation of workers who frequently change jobs. The Plan also notes that
the intelligence community faces “critical shortfalls of experienced mid-career
professionals,” because it skipped “a generation of new hires.” Also nipping away
at midcareer personnel are contractors who recruit their own employees, al-
ready cleared and trained at government expense, and then “lease” them back to
the government at considerably greater expense. Finally, the Plan notes that in
spite of its name, the intelligence community (IC) is no community at all. By
building a “national intelligence service,” integrating training, education, and
career development, and fostering an ethos of service, integrity, and account-
ability, Negroponte hopes to “bring more Community-wide coherence and co-
hesion than ever before to the way IC agencies lead and manage their people.”
Negroponte’s assignment to transform the intelligence community comes at
a difficult time, when “adversarial states have learned to mask their intentions
and capabilities” and “terrorists and other non-state actors use commonplace
technologies to boost their striking power and enhance their elusiveness.”
Equally daunting is the prospect of developing human intelligence sources for
hard targets. Doing so in a totalitarian country like North Korea or Iran is unre-
alistic. Those countries’ intelligence services deprive American operatives of re-
cruitment opportunities. The intelligence community has learned how difficult
it is to penetrate even English-speaking urban-ecoterrorist groups in the
United States, let alone a Pashto-speaking tribe in Pakistan. Negroponte recog-
nizes these challenges and sees developing “innovative ways to penetrate and
analyze the most difficult targets” as a core objective. These ways include creat-
ing “red teams” to get “inside the heads” of potential adversaries and developing
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relationships with foreign intelligence services that might be better positioned
to access hard targets.
The ultimate importance of these documents, and his own tenure, will de-
pend on Negroponte’s ability to lead the way to change in a very large, disparate
intelligence community. Without direct budgetary control, he will have to in-
spire, cajole, and perhaps somehow coerce the leaders of the sixteen different
intelligence agencies to cooperate. With the Undersecretary of Defense for Intel-
ligence reforming defense intelligence and “protecting defense assets,”
Negroponte will likely focus on the civilian agencies. It is too early to say how a
former CIA director as the new secretary of defense will affect this process. Ulti-
mately, Negroponte’s success will be based on the benchmarks listed: “to provide
accurate and timely intelligence and conduct intelligence programs and activi-
ties directed by the President” and “to transform our capabilities faster than
threats emerge, protect what needs to be protected, and perform our duties ac-
cording to the law.”
We are unlikely to see widespread change soon. It will not be until fiscal year
2008 that Negroponte’s objectives will be fully reflected within the different
agencies. In fact, with the parallel transformation of intelligence agencies and
the competing priorities among defense, civilian, and law enforcement intelli-
gence agencies, we may never see the unity that the Office of Director of Na-
tional Intelligence was intended to bring into being.
1 4 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Winter 2007.vp
Wednesday, February 28, 2007 8:14:49 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
4
Naval War College Review, Vol. 60 [2007], No. 1, Art. 10
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol60/iss1/10
